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I. Introduction
"It is not just the fighters with weapons in their hands that pose a
threat."'
Brigadier General Kenneth Watkins' statement, made in the
context of discussing an individual approach to determine
combatant status, is equally applicable to cyber operations during
interstate conflicts. The nature of cyber operations makes it likely
that many combatants on cyber battlefields will be civilians.
Hacking, writing code, and deploying viruses require a technical
sophistication beyond the capabilities of the general public and
regular solider. Governments seeking to strengthen their cyber
capabilities have and will rely heavily on civilian contractors.2 At
the same time, to join the cyber fray, all an individual with
specialized skills needs is a computer and an internet connection.
As the events in Estonia in 20073 and Georgia in 20084 illustrate,
nationalistic hackers without formal ties to a country's armed
forces are likely to be a major force on the cyber battlefield.
I Brig. Gen. Kenneth Watkin, Humans in the Cross-Hairs: Targeting and
Assassination in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING
THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 137, 147 (Matthew Evangelista & David
Wippman, eds., 2005).
2 See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon to Boost Cybersecurity Force, WASH. POST
(Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-to-
boost-cybersecurity-force/2013/01/19/d87d9dc2-5fec-1le2-bO5a-
605528f6b712_story.html (detailing the Pentagon's plans to expand the Cyber Command
by 4,000 people, including civilians).
3 See Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,
WIRED (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/
magazine/ 5-09/ff estonia?currentPage=all (relaying how Russian hackers planned and
coordinated a series of sophisticated cyber attacks on Estonia after the nation decided to
move a monument dedicated to lives lost by the Soviet Union's during World War HI).
4 See Eneken Tikk et al., Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre for Excellence,
Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified, 12-14 (Nov. 2008),
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Georgia%201 %200.pdf (finding a level
of coordination among non-government hackers unseen during the Estonian incident).
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To date, the Russian cyber attacks on Georgia during the 2008
South Ossetia War represent the only instance of massive
computer network attacks coinciding with an international armed
conflict.' But it will not be the last.6
Together, the increased use of cyber operations in interstate
conflicts and the high likelihood of civilian cyber combatants pose
a unique challenge to the law of armed conflict (LOAC).'
Commanders, soldiers, and judge advocates will have to apply the
laws of war within the fog of war to completely novel situations.
Consider two fictional but plausible scenarios that may arise in the
near future.
A. Scenario One
Iran has declared war on the United States, Israel, the United
Kingdom, and France for interfering with its "nuclear
prerogative." To halt global oil production, Iran has begun mining
the Strait of Hormuz and harassing ships attempting to enter or
exit the Persian Gulf.
In addition to mining the Strait of Hormuz, hackers
sympathetic to Iran have attempted to access computer systems at
the Pentagon, Whitehall, the H6tel de Brienne, and various U.S.
military bases located throughout the Middle East. The
relationship between the Iranian Government and the hackers is
unclear. Some of the most active hackers, though, use IP
5 Id. at 4-5.
6 See Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense Remarks on Cybersecurity to the
Business Executives for National Security (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136 ("The most
destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks on our critical
infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country.").
There has been significant debate over whether a purely cyber war will ever actually
occur. Compare RICHARD A. CLARKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL
SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2010) (arguing that cyber war is how warfare will
be conducted in the future), with THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR WILL NOT TAKE PLACE
(2013) (contending that war will not take place, in the traditional sense, in the cyber
realm. Instead, arguing that networks will be used to sabotage, subvert, and spy in ways
that replace physical violence). However, this debate should not obscure the notion that
future wars will likely involve overt acts in both physical and cyber space.
7 Throughout this Article, the phrase "law of armed conflict" (LOAC) is used
interchangeably with the "law of war" and "international humanitarian law." In all
instances, these phrases refer to the body of customary and treaty-based law governing
relations among States in armed conflicts.
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addresses traced to Bandar Abbas, Iran.
To stop the mining of the Strait of Hormuz, units of the U.S. II
Marine Expeditionary Force and the U.K. 3 Commando Brigade
have raided Bandar Abbas. You are a lieutenant commanding one
of the invading U.S. Marine Corps units. Your primary mission
has been to occupy a small section of town and guard against
counterattacks while other units permanently disable the port and
mining facilities. During the operation, command has traced the
same IP address used by the hackers to a building located in your
area. You are ordered to take the building and halt the hackers.
On the way, your unit takes small arms fire. A few of your
men are injured. At the hackers' building, though, you encounter
no resistance. Instead, you are able to approach quietly and survey
what you presume to be the hacker's room for a few seconds.
There is a tangle of ethernet cables, power cords, and USB cables
strewn about. Three young Persians in their late-teens to early-
twenties share a long table at the far wall. They face away from
you as they pound away on their laptops. Two wear headphones.
Each is engrossed in their computer's screen. None wear a
uniform. There is a pistol on a table behind the hackers, but it is
out of their reach. Your marines raise their weapons. Under the
LOAC, though, may you legally open fire?
B. Scenario Two
To assert its right to access the Pacific Ocean, Bolivia has
invaded Chile. During a counter-offensive, the Chilean Army
captured seven Bolivian contractors as they retook Chilean
territory. The contractors confess that Bolivia hired them to create
and insert a virus into Chile's air command systems to disrupt its
operation. Even though they gained electronic access to the air
command system, the contractors were captured before they could
deploy the virus. From the evidence collected, the contractors
worked with the Bolivian military but were not under military
control. When captured, none of the contractors wore uniforms,
but all carried Bolivian-issued identification cards.
You are a Chilean military judge presiding over the hearing to
determine the Prisoner of War (POW) status of the seven captured
Bolivians. If they are found not to be POWs, Chile will prosecute
them as criminal hackers and, possibly, spies. Under the LOAC,
are the contractors POWs?
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C. The Issue of Status
Even though the two scenarios differ dramatically in terms of
specifics, the answers regarding both hackers and contractors turn
on the same legal determination: each individual's status in an
Article 2 interstate conflict.' This Article applies the framework
of international humanitarian law to these scenarios to identify and
examine the problems practitioners may face in future
international armed conflicts that involve cyber battles.
Contractors, hackers, and other cyber operators without formal
connection to a State enjoy the privileges of combatants and
civilians without incurring many of the risks each group faces.
Simultaneously, they are able to participate in hostilities with
minimal loss of their civilian protection and enjoy prisoner of war
status due to both the preferences inherent in international
humanitarian law's status structure and the dual physical and
systematic dimension in which cyber operations occur. This
should not be allowed. Customary international law should
require that States either objectively incorporate non-State cyber
operators into their armed forces, or allow States to interpret
"direct participation in hostilities" more leniently and drop the
presumption of prisoner of war status for non-State cyber
operators. Such a modification in the LOAC would ensure that
non-State cyber operators do not use their status to flaunt the law
and its consequences.
To accomplish this analysis, this Article adopts a simple
organization. Part II examines the current structure the LOAC
employs to determine an individual's status and the preferences
expressed by the law. Part III explores cyber warfare's physical
and systematic nature. Part IV applies the framework of the
LOAC to the two scenarios listed above and identifies problems
with such an application. Part V proposes a shift in interpretation
of the LOAC in instances of cyber operations by non-State
8 All four treaties of the Geneva Conventions share the same language in Article
2, which establishes the treaties' applicability to both "cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict" between two or more States. See, e.g., Geneva III POW, infra note
27, art. 2. Similarly, all four treaties share the same language in Article 3, which
discusses the treaties' applicability to "conflict not of an international character." See,
e.g., Geneva III POW, infra note 27, art. 3. This Article uses the phrase "Article 2
interstate conflict" to refer to conflicts between two or more States; it uses "Article 3
intrastate conflict" to refer to conflicts within a single State.
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affiliated individuals to guarantee that non-State cyber operators
do not exploit the gray area of unlawful combatancy. This Article
concludes that States should either incorporate non-State cyber
operators into their armed forces, or States should interpret "direct
participation in hostilities" broadly enough to subject non-State
cyber operators to the costs of taking up electronic arms.
Before delving into the status of non-State cyber operators, it
is important to note two key assumptions of this Article. First, this
Article assumes an interstate conflict exists outside of the cyber
context. Making this assumption sharpens the Article in three
ways. First, it settles any question about the conflict's status,
allowing the analysis to focus exclusively on the status of
individuals. Second, assuming the existence of an Article 2
interstate conflict prevents veering into a tangential discussion
about whether a cyber attack alone is sufficient to justify a
legitimate use of force.' Third, by expressly excluding
consideration of Article 3 intrastate conflicts, there can be a deeper
and more thorough analysis of the LOAC under Article 2.
Second, this Article assumes that the LOAC applies to the
cyber context. This assumption comports with the opinion
expressed by twenty international law scholars and practitioners in
the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare.10
9 Scholars have given this question excessive consideration, but it is outside the
purview of this Article. See Reese Nguyen, Comment, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the
Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1079, 1117-29 (2013) (identifying the three
present approaches to determine if a cyber attack counts as a legitimate use of force and
then proposing a fourth approach); see also WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND
THE USE OF FORCE 129-34 (1999) (advocating a target-based approach to determine if a
cyber attack constitutes a use of force); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack
and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 914-15 (1999) (arguing for an effects-based approach to
determine if a cyber attack constitutes a use of force).
10 NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENSE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 3-6 (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2013), available at http://issuu.com/nato ccd coe/docs/tallinnmanual?e=5
903855/1802381 [hereinafter TALLIN MANUAL]. While the Tallin Manual provides an
excellent starting point by stating black letter rules for applying the LOAC to cyber
operations, its practical commentary is limited. Id. at 5-7.
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II. Combatant Status Architecture Under the Existing Law of
Armed Conflict
A. The Law ofArmed Conflict and Individuals' Status
The LOAC serves to maintain the standards of civilization
despite the necessities of war." In other words, the LOAC
attempts to limit the death and destruction inherent in warfare. 2
To achieve this objective, the LOAC restricts who or what a
belligerent' may kill or destroy lawfully.14
One essential way the LOAC constrains war's destructive
power is through the creation of individual statuses. An
individual's status dictates both one's rights and protections under
the LOAC.is Everyone in an armed conflict has a status because it
is
[a] general principle which is embodied in all four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. Every person in enemy hands must have
some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of
war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian
covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the
medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the
First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in
enemy hands can be outside the law.' 6
Fundamentally, an individual's status answers two questions.
First, whether or not an individual is a lawful military target. 7
Second, whether, upon capture, the detaining force will hold an
individual as a POW or prosecute him or her as a criminal.'
Further, an individual's status plays a significant part in the
1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (1976).
12 Id at 160-62.
13 A "belligerent" refers to a State or "power at war ... protected by and subject to
the laws of war." See WEBSTER'S STUDENTS DICTIONARY 75 (G. & C. Merriam Co.,
1974).
"4 Id.
15 GARY D. SOLIs, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN WAR 186 (2010).
16 JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (1958).
17 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 29 (2004).
18 Id at 28-30.
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application of the LOAC's core principles of distinctionl9 and
proportionality.2 0
B. Lawful Combatants and Civilians
The distinction between combatants and civilians provides the
foundation of the LOAC status architecture.2' This distinction
helps to cabin destructive force by guaranteeing that only the
combatants of belligerent nations fight.22
An individual who meets the requirements of lawful
combatancy enjoys a bundle of rights known collectively as the
"combatant's privilege."2 3 Central amongst the rights that make
up the privilege is the right to engage in hostilities.2 4 Further, as
long as a combatant's actions comply with the LOAC, the
privilege protects him from prosecution for engaging in violence.2 5
Upon capture, a lawful combatant is a prisoner of war (POW).2 6
There are four categories of lawful combatancy: armed forces,
partisans, unrecognized armed forces, and a leve en masse.2 7
With the exception of a leve en masse, lawful combatancy
requires individuals to meet four conditions:
1. Command by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. Having a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
19 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. "In order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives." Id. art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
20 See Protocol I, supra note 18, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 29
(capturing the full definition of the concept of proportionality).
21 See DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 27.
22 Id
23 See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the
Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9-10 (2004).
24 Srividhya Ragavan & Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees From the
Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 619, 632 (2005).
25 Berman, supra note 23, at 9-10.
26 See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
27 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III POW]; DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 33-
38.
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3. Carrying arms openly; and
4. Conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.28
The first requirement ensures that individuals do not wage
private wars against an enemy State. 29  Requirements two and
three distinguish combatants from civilians.30 The fourth
requirement recognizes that to be a lawful combatant, a combatant
must follow the LOAC.3 '
Some commentators infer three more conditions for lawful
combatancy from the four textual commitments.32 Under that
approach, lawful combatancy also requires hierarchical
organization, non-allegiance to the detaining party, and individual
membership to a party to the conflict. 33 State practice typically
does not require the first two extra elements.34 Most practitioners
concede that belonging to a party to the conflict is an implicit
condition of lawful combatancy."
Even though treaties do not explicitly identify any conditions
armed forces and unrecognized armed forces must meet to be
lawful combatants,36 they still must meet the four conditions that
apply to partisans.3 7 The law presumes that military units, by their
very nature, will comply with those conditions.3 8
The only category of lawful combatants that do not have to
meet the four requirements for lawful combatancy is a levee en
masse, which represents a special category of combatants between
civilians and members of the armed forces.3 9 A movement rarely
28 Geneva III POW, supra note 26, art. 4, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
29 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 37.
30 Id. at 37-38.
31 Id. at 39.
32 Id. at 39-41.
33 Id.
34 SOLIS, supra note 15, at 197-98.
35 Id. at 198.
36 See Geneva III POW, supra note 26, arts. 4(A)(1), 4(A)(3), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
37 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 36.
38 Id.
39 Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 831, 840 (2010).
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supports the determination that a levee en masse exists.4 0 The law
defines it as when "inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on
the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect
the laws and customs of war."4 1 Treaties necessitate a levie en
masse to be spontaneous and unorganized.42 Basically, the
concept eliminates combatancy's requirement for organization and
distinction when a belligerent nation invades another nation.4 3
Anyone who does not fall within the four categories of lawful
combatancy qualifies as a civilian.4 4 Thus, the LOAC defines
civilians negatively.45 Further, the definition is over-inclusive
because multiple participants in hostilities are classified as
civilians. For example, mercenaries are civilians under this
definition.4 6 Moreover, "in case of doubt whether a person is a
civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.'A7 The
presumption of civilian status and the over-inclusive definition
expresses the LOAC's preference for finding individuals to be
civilians.
Civilians, like lawful combatants, enjoy a bevy of rights.48
Chief amongst the rights of civilians is a "general protection
against dangers arising from military operations," including not
being objects of attack.49
40 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 57-58 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960)
[hereinafter GENEVA III COMMENTARY].
41 Geneva III POW, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(6).
42 MELZER, supra note 39, at 840.
43 Compare Geneva III POW, supra note 28, art. 4(2), (setting out the
requirements of combatancy), with id. art. 4(6), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 (describing a levie en
masse).
44 See Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 50(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
45 Id
46 See infra notes 108-123 and accompanying text.
47 Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 50(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
48 See generally, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in the Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
49 Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 51(1)-(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
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C. Prisoners of War
Upon falling into the hands of the enemy, the LOAC entitles
lawful combatants and a small, unique section of civilians to POW
status." "[S]ubject to the conditio sine qua non that he is a lawful
combatant[,]" every lawful combatant has an "[e]ntitlement to the
status of prisoner of war-upon being captured by the enemy[.]"'
That is why four out of the six categories that Article 4 of the
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War-the
core definition of prisoners of war-are the same as the four
categories that define lawful combatants.5 2
Besides members of the armed forces, 3 partisans, 54 un-
recognized armed forces,55 and a levie en masse,56 two non-
combatant groups have a right to be POWs. First, non-combatant
crewmembers, like merchant marine sailors or civilian aircraft
pilots, qualify as POWs.5 ' This grant of POW status provides a
minimum standard when they "do not benefit by more favourable
treatment under any other provisions of international law."58
Second, POW status goes to persons accompanying the armed
forces who are not members of the armed forces, such as war
correspondents and supply contractors.5 ' The list of individuals is
not exhaustive.60 Instead, any individual that accompanies the
armed forces may receive POW status if he has authorization from
the armed forces and an identity card indicating that
50 Geneva III POW, supra note 27, art. 4(A), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40.
51 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 29.
52 See Geneva III POW, supra note 27, arts. 4(A)(1)-(3), (6), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-
40.
53 Id. art. 4(A)(1), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
54 Id art. 4(A)(2), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
5 See id art. 4(A)(3), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 (including those armed forces under a
power "not recognized by the Detaining Power" or adverse country).
56 See id. art. 4(A)(6), 75 U.N.T.S. at 140 (including those who react to an
invading enemy and "spontaneously take up arms to resist" before organizing themselves
into customary military divisions).
57 See Geneva III POW, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(5), 75 U.N.T.S. at 140.
58 Id.
59 See Geneva III POW, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(4), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
60 See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 42-43 (stating that service
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, are also included in
the list of individuals granted POW status under art. 4(A)(4)).
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authorization.6 1 The identification card serves the same function
as a uniform: to distinguish those who deserve POW status from
those who do not.6 2
The LOAC expresses a preference for affording individuals
POW status. Protocol I implies that even unlawful combatants
receive protections equivalent to POW status. 63 Further, there is a
presumption that anyone who "falls into the power of an adverse
Party shall be presumed to be a [POW].""4 If there is any dispute
over whether or not an individual deserves POW status, a
competent tribunal will decide. 65 During the interim of a definitive
determination, the individual enjoys the privileges of a POW. 6 6
POWs receive a number of protections and rights under the
LOAC. 67  These include the right to humane treatment,68
maintenance and medical care free of charge, 69 and exemption
from serving as slave labor.70 POWs also cannot be prosecuted for
participating in hostilities.7' For example, a combatant cannot be
prosecuted for murder for the deaths he caused during hostilities.
This stems from the fact that the purpose of detaining combatants
61 Geneva III POW, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(4), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
62 See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 47 ("The identity card
corresponds virtually to a soldier's uniform or a partisan's arm-band.").
63 Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 44(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23. It is worth noting that
the United States specifically objects to the affording of POW status to unlawful
combatants. See Michael J. Matheson, Remarks on the United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions reprinted in The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington
College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L &
POL'Y415,425 (1987).
64 Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 45(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24.
65 Id; Geneva III POW, supra note 27, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42.
66 Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 45(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24; Geneva III POW,
supra note 28, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42.
67 See generally, Geneva III POW, supra note 27 (detailing the basic protections
afforded to all prisoners of war).
68 Geneva III POW, supra note 27, arts. 13, 17, 21-48, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146, 148-
50, 152-72.
69 Id. art. 15, 75 U.N.T.S. at 148.
70 Id. arts. 49-57, 75 U.N.T.S. at 172-78.
71 See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance ofPOW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
367, 376 (2004) (explaining that prisoners of war are entitled to "combat immunity").
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as POWs is to keep them out of the fight, not to punish them.7 2
D. Direct Participation in Hostilities
The last component of the status architecture of the LOAC
deals with instances in which civilians join the fight. No general
prohibition exists against civilians participating in combat; instead,
the LOAC holds that when civilians take an active role in combat,
they lose their protected status.73  Such individuals are neither
lawful combatants nor civilians, but occupy the gray area between
the two as "unlawful combatants."74 Lawful combatants may
target such unlawful combatants within the parameters of the
LOAC. 75 In addition to losing civilian-status protections, unlawful
combatants may face criminal liability and cannot claim the
privilege of POW status upon capture. 76
Civilians, though, do not lose their status as such, "unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." A civilian
is deemed to have participated directly in hostilities when three
elements are satisfied:
1. [T]he act must be likely to adversely affect the military
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed
conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or
destruction on persons or objects protected against direct
attack (threshold of harm)[;]
2. [T]here must be a direct causal link between the act and
the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a
coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes
an integral part (direct causation)[;] and
3. [T]he act must be specifically designed to directly cause
the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the
conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent
nexus).78
72 See Berman, supra note 23, at 9 ("The detention of combatants is not
punishment, but rather, simply a way of putting combatants hors de combat for the
duration of the conflict.").
73 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 27.
74 Id. at 29.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1942).
77 Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 51 (3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
78 NILS MELZER, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
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All three elements must be met for a civilian to lose his protected
status.79
The threshold of harm may be met either by adversely
affecting military operations or by inflicting death or destruction
on people or objects. 80 The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC)" found that "[e]lectronic interference with military
computer networks" may satisfy the adversely affecting military
prong of the threshold of harm element "whether through
Computer Network Attacks (CNA) or Computer Network
Exploitation (CNE), as well as wiretapping the adversary's high
command or transmitting tactical targeting information for an
attack."82
To meet the causation requirements, the harm "must be
brought about in one causal step."8 This excludes an individual
from directly participating in hostilities by contributing to the
general war effort, such as building tanks; or performing war-
* 84sustaining activities, such as completing financial transactions.
Direct causation requires the action to bring about the required
harm. Causation may still exist despite a significant lag in time
between the act and the harm or a significant amount of proximal
space between the action and the harm.8 6
The belligerent nexus requirement exists to tie the action to the
hostilities between two nations. It prevents actions of civil unrest
or the exercise of self-defense against members of a belligerent's
armed forces from depriving a civilian of his status. A
belligerent nexus exists when "the conduct of a civilian, in
conjunction with the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 46 (2009).
79 Id
80 Id at 47-50.
81 The ICRC is a well-regarded corporate publicist. See SoLs, supra note 15, at
19-20.
82 MELZER, supra note 78, at 48.
83 Id. at 53.
84 Id at 51-52.
85 Id. at 52.
86 Id. at 55.
87 MELZER, supra note 78, at 58-59.
88 Id. at 61-63.
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and place, can reasonably be perceived as an act designed to
support one party to the conflict by directly causing the required
threshold of harm to another party." 9
A civilian that satisfies all three elements, and thus directly
participates in hostilities, loses the protection given to civilians
only for the duration of the specific qualifying act." Once the
civilian ceases such an act, he regains the protections civilians
enjoy.9 1 This stands in direct contrast with individuals who
exercise a continuous combat function.9 2 Such individuals are
always unlawful combatants and are, therefore, continually lawful
targets for direct attack. 93
E. Spies and Mercenaries
On top of this general framework, the LOAC overlays two
unique categories: spies and mercenaries.9 4 If an individual's
actions qualify one as either a spy or mercenary, then the
individual's general status is negated, and the unique rules for
those narrow categories apply. This section examines both special
categories and the effect they have on an individual's status.
1. Spies
The LOAC permits spying.95 Civilians and lawful combatants
alike can qualify as spies. 96 To be a spy, three elements must be
present. First, the person must act either clandestinely or under
89 Id. at 63-64.
90 Id. at 70.
91 Id.
92 See MELZER, supra note 78, at 70-72.
93 Id. at 71-72.
94 See Protocol 1, supra note 19, arts. 46-47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24-25 (categorizing,
describing, and distinguishing spies and mercenaries).
95 See Hague Convention IV (Hague IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter
Hague IV] (allowing for the use of ruses of war and methods of obtaining enemy
information). See id. art. 24.
96 See Won Kidane, The Status of Private Military Contractors Under
International Humanitarian Law, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 361, 386-87 (2010)
(stating the standard used to determine spying depends upon the manner used to collect
information, not on the individual's combatant status). Cf, DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at
212 (noting that Article 46 of Protocol I is limited to members of the armed forces, while
the Hague Convention relates to both soldiers and civilians).
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false pretenses.97 A lawful combatant acts clandestinely, only if
they do so out of uniform." Second, the individual "obtains or
endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a
belligerent."99 The "zone of operations" of a belligerent extends
beyond the battlefield into areas controlled by a hostile State.'o
At the same time, "[a] person stationed on his own State's side of
the front line-say, clandestinely monitoring or deciphering
enemy radio signals-is not a spy. A spy must be located
physically within an area controlled by the enemy."o' Third, the
individual obtaining the information must intend to communicate
it to a party hostile to the belligerent.'0 2
Spying affects an individual's POW status. Civilians and
members of the armed forces caught spying do not have the right
to be POWs.'03 If caught, a spy may be punished criminally.'04
National law, though, not the LOAC, criminalizes espionage. 0 5
If a member of the armed forces, wearing his nation's uniform,
meets all of the criteria of spying, he is not a spy.106  Also, a
member of the armed forces only loses his right to POW status if
caught in the act of espionage. Otherwise, once he rejoins his unit,
a member of the armed forces regains the right to be a prisoner of
war. 07
2. Mercenaries
To qualify as a mercenary under Article 47 of Protocol I, an
97 Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 46(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24.
98 Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 46(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24.
99 See Hague IV, supra note 95, art. 29.
100 See DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 209 (stating that spying technically is only
considered "spying" when it is behind enemy lines, including those of an enemy State).
101 Id
102 Hague IV, supra note 95, art. 29.
103 Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 46(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24; see also Hague IV,
supra note 95, art. 30 ("A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous
trial.").
104 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 210.
105 Id. at 211 ("[Spies may be] prosecuted and punished ... on the basis of the
national criminal legislation of the belligerent State against whose interests he acted.").
106 Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 46(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24.
107 Id. art. 46(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
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individual must meet six specific criteria. 08  First, an individual
must be specially recruited to fight in an armed conflict.'09
Second, the person must take a direct part in the hostilities.'"
Third, an individual can be "neither a national of a Party to the
conflict nor a resident of a territory occupied by a Party of the
conflict.""' Fourth, a person cannot be a member of the armed
forces of a party." 2 Fifth, the individual who is a member of the
armed forces of a State that is not a party to the armed conflict
may not be sent there on official duty by its State."' Sixth, to be a
mercenary, an individual's main motivation must be private
gain." Specifically, the state hiring the person must in fact
promise compensation, which must be "substantially in excess of
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions
in the armed forces of that Party ....
Protocol I provides flatly: "[a] mercenary shall not have the
right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.""16  While
mercenaries have been present on the battlefield for at least one
thousand years, the flat prohibition on their participation stems
only from efforts during the 1960s to stop Europeans and North
Americans from profiting and participating in African struggles
for independence."' Absent the right to participate in hostilities,
mercenaries are criminally liable for their actions and, upon
capture, may be prosecuted."' Despite the strength of the
108 Id. art. 47(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
109 Id. art. 47(2)(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
110 Id. art. 47(2)(b) 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25, The requirement for direct participation in
hostilities is unsettled because the International Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries excluded it from its definition of
mercenaries while otherwise following Protocol I. See The International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34,
U.N. Doc. A/44/34 (Dec. 4,1989).
III See Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 47(2)(d), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
112 Id art. 46(2)(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
113 Id art. 46(2)(f), 125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
114 Id. art. 46(2)(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
115 Id.
116 See Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 46(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 24.
117 See Marie-France Major, Mercenaries and International Law, 22 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 103, 104-07 (1992) (capturing succinctly the role of mercenaries in armed
conflict and their banning).
118 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 52.
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international consensus against mercenaries,"' the United States
specifically objects to including it as customary international law
because it introduces political factors into the LOAC.12 0
The prohibition on mercenaries is extremely narrow because
all six requirements must be met. 12 1 Foreign nationals directly
incorporated in armed forces-like the French Foreign Legion-
foreign advisors, and military technicians, fall outside of the strict
definition of mercenaries.122 Countries can subvert the strictures
of Article 47 simply by incorporating mercenaries directly into
their armed forces.12 3
III. The Dual Dimensions of Cyber Operations
Cyber operations are unique when compared to their nautical,
aerial, and terrestrial counterparts. Unlike the other three, which
occur only within the physical environment, cyber actions take
place both in the physical and systematic world. Cyber actions'
dual nature complicates attempts to apply the LOAC to determine
the individual status of hacktivists'2 4 and computer contractors.
Specifically, it raises two fundamental questions that, regardless of
their resolution, permit the preferences inherent in the LOAC to
influence strongly the determination of a hacktivist or computer
contractor's status. Using the Stuxnet Virus that destroyed Iran's
uranium enriching centrifuges as an example, this section explains
both the physical and systemic dimension of cyber operations and
how it complicates application of the LOAC.
119 See James R. Coleman, Constraining Modern Mercenarism, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
1493, 1497 (2004) (describing the emerging agreements among nations regulating
mercenarism).
120 See Matheson, supra note 63, at 426.
121 Won Kidane, The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International
Humanitarian Law, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 361, 388-89 (2010).
122 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 51.
123 Id. at 51-52.
124 A combination of "hack (in the computer sense)" and "activism," the term
"Hacktivism" can be defined as "the practice of gaining unauthorized access to a
computer system and carrying out various disruptive actions as a means of achieving
political or social goals[.]" Hacktivism, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/hacktivism (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
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A. Physical Domain
Clearly, people conduct cyber operations in the physical
dimension. The "physical" dimension, for purposes of this
Article, means the tangible world where physics, biology, and
chemistry govern the battlefield. Created by the forces of nature,
the physical domain is where flesh and blood meet keyboard and
ethernet cables. The individual creating cyber weapons operates,
and the ultimate effect of those weapons occurs, within the
physical world. At its most basic, cyber action in the physical
domain is the interaction of people and the natural world with
computers. The Stuxnet Virus illustrates cyber operations'
physical dimension in three specific ways. First, when individuals
sitting at computers created the Stuxnet Virus, they acted in the
physical environment.125 Second, when a few individuals pushed
thumb drives into USB ports on various Iranian computers, they
conducted cyber operations in the physical realm.126 Third, cyber
operations occurred in the physical world when the virus sped up
the uranium enriching centrifuges to the point that they
shattered.127
B. Systematic
In addition to the physical world, cyber actions also transpire
in the systematic world. The "systematic" environment, for
purposes of this Article, is the network of computers linked
together and sustained through self-automation. Processing
power, memory, algorithms, and the rules of computer science
govern this battlefield. An actual ethernet cable is not part of the
systematic environment, but the information and lines of code
traveling through it are integral elements. When information
breaches a firewall, an actual wall is not penetrated. Instead,
breach of a firewall happens when malicious information packets
gain access to the defended computer despite the security program.
The launching of a virus and its interaction with, and effect on,
other computer systems define cyber operation in the systematic
125 See Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber War, VANITY FAIR, Apr.
2011, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104.
126 See id. (indicating that a "new propagation mechanism" of Stuxnet was "the
ability to spread seamlessly and invisibly via USB sticks").
127 Id
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dimension. Reduced to its most basic idea, cyber action in the
systematic environment is the interaction of computers with other
computers.
Events surrounding the Stuxnet Virus demonstrate the
systematic dimension of cyber action. After someone inserted the
memory stick into a computer, the virus's insertion of itself within
the code of the computer happened in the systematic world.'2 8
When the virus sent commands to the controller to alter the speed
of the centrifuges, the cyber action took place in the systematic
environment.'2 9  Cyber operations occurred in the systematic
world when the virus spread, through inter-connected systems, to
infect computers in India, Indonesia, Europe, and the United
States.'30
C. Questions Raised By the Dual-Dimensions About the
Application of the LOAC
Cyber operations' dual dimensions make applying the LOAC
to determine an individual's status more complicated.
Specifically, they interject two fundamental, intertwined questions
about applying the LOAC to cyber operatives.'' First, must an
individual meet the requirements of a status both in the physical
and systematic dimensions? The requirement of distinction
demonstrates the implications of this question. If an individual
must meet the elements of a particular status in both dimensions,
then to qualify as a member of a militia, one would have to
distinguish oneself in both worlds. Basically, requiring an
individual to adhere to the requirements in both domains doubles
the necessary elements one must fulfill to obtain a specific status.
If a person does not have to satisfy the elements of a status in
both dimensions, then a second question arises: can evidence from
either domain satisfy the requirements of a particular status?
Rejecting the need to fulfill the elements in both spheres implicitly
considers what evidence is sufficient to determine status. By
applying the LOAC in other contexts, it is indisputable that actions
128 Id.
129 Id
130 See Gross, supra note 125 (indicating that the virus has been found in India,
Indonesia, Europe, and the United States).
131 Attempts to answer these questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
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in the physical world may justify particular statuses. The practical
question thus becomes: can actions in the systematic environment
alone satisfy a status element? For example, can malicious code in
a Georgian computer system with lines of codes identifying the
code's source as Russian, alone fulfill the belligerent nexus
requirement of direct participation in hostilities? If such cyber
operations in the systematic environment can satisfy status
requirements, then the universe of possible evidence doubles. If
actions in the systematic world cannot meet the elements for a
particular status, then there must be a case-by-case determination
of whether the cyber action took place in the physical or
systematic dimension. Either answer complicates the application
of the LOAC either by expanding the universe of proof or by
requiring a distinction in each case between actions occurring in
the physical and systematic environments before analyzing status
questions.
Regardless of the specific answer to either of these two
questions, cyber action's physical and systematic nature
complicates status analysis under the LOAC. Those complications
create a space in which the preferences inherent in the law can
have a determinative influence on status determinations. In
situations that are not clear-cut, the added difficulty of cyber
operations' dual dimensions makes a status determination even
less clear. To navigate such situations, decision makers will rely
heavily on the preferences inherent in the LOAC. Thus, in
deciding the close case of whether a hacker is a POW or criminal,
he will likely be classified as a POW due to the LOAC's
preference for affording such a status.'32
IV. Contractors' and Hacktivists' Statuses Under the Existing
Law of Armed Conflict
Applying the LOAC to specific situations illustrates that the
status structure and dual environment of cyber conflicts permit
non-State cyber operators to enjoy all the benefits of various
statuses while avoiding the risks. This section elucidates this idea
by applying the LOAC to answer the questions posed in the two
scenarios above.133
132 See supra Part II.B.
133 See supra Part I.A-B.
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A. Hacktivists' Status
To determine whether the U.S. Marines may lawfully target
the Iranian hackers, a Marine would have to go through a two-step
process. First, the Marine Lieutenant must decide whether the
Iranian hacktivists fit within one of the four categories of lawful
combatants. If not, the Marine Lieutenant then decides whether
the Iranian hacktivists have committed an act that qualifies as
directly participating in hostilities, so as to forfeit their civilian
protection from targeting.
The Iranian hackers are not partisans nor members of a
recognized or unrecognized armed force because they do not meet
the four explicit requirements of lawful combatancy. As Iranians,
they are citizens of a party to the conflict. Beyond that, they fail
the four formal requirements of lawful combatancy. First, there is
no commander responsible for his subordinates. Second, none of
the men are uniformed nor in any manner distinguish themselves
from civilians. Third, even though there is a gun, none of the
individuals are openly carrying weapons. Some may argue that, in
this instance, the hacker's weapon is their personal computer. But
computers themselves are not inherently weapons. Only a
person's technical skills transform computers into arms. Finally,
since they lack a commander, the Iranian hackers do not comply
with the customary LOAC.
Cyber operations' dual natures make it difficult for non-State
cyber operators to meet the requirements of lawful combatancy.
Cyber weapons, by their nature, are covert and concealed. It
seems impossible for a hacktivist to carry a weapon openly, either
in the systematic or physical environment. Even if they could, to
do so would negate some of cyber warfare's advantages. Most
hackers will be unable to satisfy the responsible commander
requirement because most hacking organizations lack hierarchical
organization.'3 4  Distinction is difficult for non-State cyber
operators. The members of a group of hacktivists will not have a
physically distinctive indicator because they, most likely, only
134 See Quinn Norton, How Anonymous Picks Targets, Launches Attacks, and
Takes Powerful Organizations Down, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2012, 6:30 A.M.), available at
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/ff anonymous/ (describing a hacking
organization as a "do-ocracy").
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operate online.'13  Further, in the systematic environment, specific
lines of code will likely distinguish groups. Since anyone who
knows about that code can copy it, it seems easy for imitators to
connect certain groups to certain actions simply by inserting their
unique identifying code into that attack. Thus, it is difficult to
consider something a distinguishing indicator when it cannot be
connected definitely to a unique group of people.
Additionally, the Iranian hackers do not satisfy the definition
of a levie en masse. Their cyber activities happened before the
Americans and British invaded, not after the approach of enemy
belligerents. More broadly, it is difficult to maintain that hackers
are defending their physical homeland by attacking the systematic
homeland of an adversary. Also, the development and deployment
of cyber weapons take time. The planning needed to launch a
cyber attack runs counter to a levee en masse's spontaneity
requirement.
Since the Iranian hackers are not lawful combatants, they must
fall within the LOAC's broad definition of civilians. Despite their
hostile actions, the LOAC's preference to consider individuals to
be civilians will decisively label the Iranian hackers as civilians.
Therefore, whether they may be lawfully targeted depends on
whether, because they directly participated in hostilities, they are
stripped of their protections from attack.
Scholars recognize a spectrum of cyber actions that may
qualify as direct participation in hostilities.13 6 On one end of the
spectrum, general research into the development of cyber weapons
does not qualify as direct participation in hostilities.' On the
other, there is direct participation in hostilities when a civilian
directly enters the commands necessary to commence a cyber
action.138 The tipping point between the civilian retaining his
protection and losing it comes when planting a malicious agent
that does not immediately cause damage but may do so
subsequently.'3 9 Most cyber actions do not qualify a civilian as
135 Id
136 David Turns, Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 279, 294-96 (2012).
137 Id. at 295.
138 Id
139 Id
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directly participating in hostilities. 14 0
In the case of the Iranian hackers, their actions likely satisfy
the harm element but fail to meet the elements of direct causation
and belligerent nexus. As Interpretative Guidancel41 recognizes,
cyber attacks, including attempted cyber network exploitation-
akin to what the Iranian hackers attempted-meet the threshold of
harm.14 2 Showing that the Iranian hackers directly participated in
hostilities is difficult because of the strict requirements of direct
causation and a belligerent nexus. Direct causation is difficult to
prove because it requires only one step from the three individuals
typing in the building to the cyber attacks on the various defense
networks. The connection between a civilian's actions and a cyber
action takes far more steps than direct causation allows. Also, this
example lacks the required belligerent nexus. While it may have
caused the threshold of harm to the Americans, French, and
English, the connection to the Iranian hackers aiding the Iranians
is unclear.
Even if the Iranian hackers meet the elements of direct
participation for the previous hacks, after ceasing those cyber
attacks, the hackers would once again become civilians. Direct
participation in hostilities allows for targeting while individuals
directly participate in hostilities. As soon as they stop
participating, civilians regain their immunity from attack.143
Accordingly, the Iranian hackers in this example are not targetable
because they are no longer directly participating in hostilities by
hacking into foreign defense departments.
The dual nature of cyber operations greatly hampers
assessment of whether a civilian directly participated in hostilities.
Since cyber weapons can sit dormant in the systematic realm for
long periods of time, it is hard to assess the time frame in which a
non-State cyber operator actually participates in hostilities and,
therefore, becomes a viable target in the physical world. Also, it is
philosophically challenging to maintain that a non-State cyber
actor's systematic actions somehow benefit a specific belligerent
in a confrontation in the physical world. Finally, the single-step
140 Id
141 See MELZER, supra note 78, at 46.
142 See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
143 See supra Part I.B.
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causation requirement excludes more complex cyber actions,
which require more indirect causal actions in the systematic
environment, from supporting the conclusion that a hacktivist
directly participated in hostilities.
Since the dual dimensions of cyber actions complicates
showing that an individual was either a lawful or unlawful
combatant, the LOAC's preference for civilians will make the
Iranian hackers unlawful targets. Even though, in this scenario,
hacktivists sympathetic to one belligerent have conducted cyber
operations against its enemies as if they were combatants, they
would retain their civilian protection from lawful targeting.
B. Contractors' Status
The Chilean judge would go through a two-step process to
determine whether the Bolivian contractors are POWs or civilians
subject to criminal liability. First, the judge would decide whether
the contractors fit within any of the six categories affording POW
status under the LOAC. If so, the judge next would determine if
their actions placed them in a unique status, like mercenaries or
spies, which would strip them of POW status. From capture until
the judge reached a decision, the LOAC presumes the Bolivian
contractors to be POWs. Accordingly, the Chileans detaining the
Bolivian contractors must treat them as POWs.
Although, arguably, they may fulfill more of the requirements,
the Bolivian contractors, like the Iranian hackers, are not lawful
combatants. For the reasons discussed above, non-state cyber
operators will find it difficult to meet the requirements of
combatancy.144 Conceivably, cyber contractors have a better shot
at fulfilling the elements than their hacker counterparts. A
proponent of such a status may argue that a manager responsible
for his employees' actions equates a responsible commander.
Still, contractors working on cyber operations will face the same
difficulties that the hackers encountered with distinction and
openly carrying a weapon.
The Bolivian contractors are not part of a levie en masse or
non-combatant transportation crews. Their country was the
invading nation, so the category, meant only for invaded countries,
144 See supra Part IV.A.
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does not provide the Bolivian contractors with POW status. 145
Further, they do not qualify for POW status as members of non-
combatant transportation crews. 146 They are computer specialists,
not drivers or pilots.
Under the LOAC, the Bolivian contractors likely deserve
POW status because they are individuals accompanying an armed
force and carry identification cards issued by the Bolivian Armed
Forces. In other situations, though, the dual nature of cyber
operations may stretch this notion to its limits. An armed force
may credential cyber contractors that do not physically accompany
the military. Instead, the contractors may be thousands of miles
away conducting systematic actions that affect the physical locale
the armed force occupies. If an opposing belligerent captured
those remote computer contractors, it is debatable whether they
would qualify as POWs under this provision.'4 7
Due to the narrow definitions of spies and mercenaries, in
conjunction with the dual environment in which cyber operators
work, the Bolivian contractors would retain their POW status.'48
The Bolivian contractors are not spies because they were
attempting to disrupt an air command system; they were not trying
to obtain information and translate it back to a hostile party.
Conceivably, any cyber action could meet the requirement for
participating in a clandestine act or acting under false pretenses
because all cyber actions in the systemic dimension are
clandestine. This is true regardless of whether those actions are
covert in the physical domain. Further, it is debatable whether a
belligerent's "zone of operation" extends from the physical
environment into the systematic. Supporting that conclusion is the
idea that a State controls cyber space by providing the
infrastructure supporting it. But just because the belligerent
controls it does not mean the alleged spy had to invade that space
to obtain the information. Thus, similar to someone monitoring
enemy radio signals, cyber contractors may never physically
invade a zone of operation.
The Bolivian contractors are not mercenaries because they are
145 See supra Part ILC (discussing POW status).
146 Id
147 Id.
148 See supra notes 108-123 and accompanying text.
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citizens of one of the belligerent parties and were not recruited to
fight in the conflict.149 Cyber operations' systematic and physical
dimensions test whether cyber contractors can be considered
mercenaries. Specifically, it questions whether someone hired to
conduct specific operations in systematic space was recruited
specifically to fight. Ultimately, the Bolivian cyber contractors
fail to implicate the narrow definitions of mercenaries or spies that
would strip them of their POW status.'
Despite taking part in hostilities as unlawful combatants by
creating and attempting to employ a virus that would have had
adverse military effect on an enemy party, the Bolivian contractors
will enjoy POW status.
V. Altering the Law of Armed Conflict to Ensure Non-State
Cyber Operators Incur the Risks of Participating In
Hostilities
Presently, under the LOAC, both hackers and contractors that
participate in hostilities enjoy protections, such as POW status,
without incurring risks, such as continuously being a lawful target.
The LOAC should not allow hackers and cyber contractors to
exploit this gray area of unlawful combatancy easily and with
impunity.
To address this problem, the present LOAC must be altered
specifically for non-State cyber operators. States should be
offered a choice: incorporate hackers and cyber contractors into
their armed forces or force hackers to accept a more lenient
application of the direct participation in hostilities standard and
discord any presumption of POW status.
Specifically, the direct participation in hostilities standard
would be relaxed across the board. For non-State cyber operators,
the threshold of harm would be met if a member of a country's
military had to act, in any manner, in response to a cyber action.
Thus, it is enough to "likely adversely effect military operations"
if a member of the armed forces had to, or will have to, spend time
addressing a threat.'"' With direct causation, the requirement for
149 See supra Part Il.E.2 (discussing mercenary status).
150 See supra Part II.E (discussing spy and mercenary status).
151 See supra Part I.D (discussing the "direct participation in hostilities"
requirement of combatancy). See Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-
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non-State cyber actors will be lowered so that any causation,
whether in the systematic or physical domain, is enough to satisfy
the element. For example, the requirement would be met if a
hacker-created virus infiltrated a firewall. As for the belligerent
nexus, non-State cyber operators will fulfill the requirement as
long as, in addition to meeting the threshold of harm to one
belligerent nation, some articulable connection exists between the
hackers and the benefited belligerent. Thus, the fact that the
hackers in the first scenario were Iranian would be enough to
satisfy the belligerent nexus.
Further, non-State cyber operators will lose the presumption
that they are POWs. While still entitled to the general protections
of Article 75 of Protocol I,152 the burden will be on non-State
cyber operators to show from the start that they deserve POW
status.
This approach ensures that non-State cyber operators cannot
abuse the ambiguity of unlawful combatancy without facing
consequences. They must either become lawful combatants as
members of a nation's armed forces or continue as unlawful
combatants that face the same consequences of foregoing their
civilian protection. Forcing non-State cyber actors into the Armed
Forces will make them constantly lawful targets but give them
POW status. Otherwise, non-State cyber actors will have to deal
with always being lawful targets and facing possible criminal
liability upon capture.
Also, this approach promotes the LOAC. If a State
incorporates cyber operators into their armed forces, those
individuals must follow the LOAC. This approach incentivizes
incorporation of non-State cyber operators. It may be best
understood as rewarding those that follow the LOAC with a
guarantee of POW status. By depriving non-adherents of civilian
protection from targeting and the presumption of POW status, this
approach at least disincentivizes non-compliance with the LOAC.
There are at least two shortcomings to this approach. First, it
would expand the number of individuals who lawfully could be
38 (providing the fundamental rights and minimum standards of humane treatment
guaranteed to those persons not afforded more favorable treatment under the Geneva
Conventions or under Protocol 1).
152 See Protocol 1, supra note 19, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38.
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killed. Relaxation of the requirements of direct participation in
hostilities would mean more individuals would fall into the
category and thus become lawful targets. Increasing the number
of individuals who could be targeted legally runs counter to the
LOAC's purpose of constraining the impact and scope of
hostilities.
Second, loosely interpreting direct participation in hostilities to
allow targeting of hackers and contractors creates a slippery slope.
Once the stringency of the direct participation requirements are
relaxed for hackers and contractors, nations may be quicker to
relax the same rules for other disfavored groups. This process
could repeat itself until there were no meaningful distinctions
between civilians and lawful combatants and either could be killed
freely.
As to the first criticism, the alteration will do more to advance
the purposes of the LOAC than to subvert it. Admittedly, in the
aggregate, a few more individuals will become lawful targets than
previously. At the same time, though, the LOAC will likely be
applied more broadly. When nations incorporate hackers and
contractors into their armed forces, they will require them, in their
operations, to follow the LOAC. Even if nations do not
incorporate hackers and contractors into their armed forces,
nations seeking to target those individuals will still have to go
through the same legal analysis. Rules of proportionality and
military necessity will still constrain targeting the hackers.
Ultimately, allowing the possibility of armed forces to target a few
more individuals within the strictures of the LOAC has to take
precedent over permitting contractors and hackers to inflict
military harm outside the strictures of the LOAC.
As to the second criticism, a deep descent down a predicted
slippery slope misunderstands how nations create international law
and would represent a striking reversal of the recent trend in the
LOAC. Treaties or customary international practice create the
LOAC.'5 3  Writing treaties and transforming customary
international law takes a significant amount of time.154 It is naYve
153 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 9-15 (describing the sources of the LOAC).
154 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment:" Accelerating
Formation of Customary International Law, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 446 (2010)
("[T]he process of establishing customary international law can take decades or even
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to think this minor alteration in the LOAC would lead to a quick
descent into lawless wars. Further, such a decline would represent
an astonishing reversal in the recent trend of international law.
Since the end of World War II, nations, through international law,
have attempted to give civilians greater protection from the
destruction of war."' Due to both of these facts, it seems unlikely
that a slight expansion of direct participation in hostilities for
cyber contractors and hacktivists would cause a broader
breakdown in the civilian-combatant distinction.
Objections aside, the LOAC must be modified to prevent non-
State cyber operators from exploiting the gray area of unlawful
combatancy. To accomplish this objective, States should have the
option of making non-State cyber operators into State cyber
operators by incorporating them into their armed forces or letting
those individuals face a more lenient standard for direct
participation in hostilities and loss of the presumption of POW
status.
VI. Conclusion
As cyber warfare increases, non-State cyber operators like
civilian contractors and hacktivists will play a larger and larger
role in combat. Their presence on the battlefield poses unique
challenges to applying the LOAC. The LOAC has a preference
for civilian and POW statuses.15 6 Along with those specific
statuses come protections from targeting and immunity from
criminal prosecution. Cyber operations, unlike their nautical,
aerial, or terrestrial counterparts, happen in the physical and
systemic environments.
These two factors together, the LOAC's preferences and the
dual dimensions in which cyber operations occur, allow non-State
cyber operators to enjoy the best of both status worlds. As
civilians that enjoy protection from direct attack, they may fight
without forfeiting their status due to the difficulty of proving direct
centuries").
155 See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Questioning Civilian Immunity, 43 TEX. INT'L J.
453, 455-57 (2008) (explaining that international law has attempted to limit civilian
deaths and property damage related to war but has done an extremely poor job at actually
achieving that goal).
156 See supra Part 1I.B.
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participation in hostilities. If captured, non-State cyber operators
may claim POW status and enjoy immunity from prosecution
despite being unlawful combatants. The LOAC must prevent
hacktivists and cyber contractors from occupying the gray area of
unlawful combatancy by making the law more black and white.
States should be given a choice: either directly incorporate them
into armed forces or apply to those individuals a broader
interpretation of direct participation in hostilities, effectively
eliminating the presumption of POW status. This new approach is
necessary to ensure that non-State cyber operators face the same
risks as other unlawful combatants.

